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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — DUE PROCESS OF LAW — RECEPTION OF VERDICT IN PRISONER'S ABSENCE — UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONVICTION UNDER VALID STATUTE. — The appellant was convicted of murder by a verdict rendered in his absence, to which, however, his counsel had consented. On his first motion for a new trial, this was not specified as error, and both the trial and appellate courts found untrue allegations that the jury had been dominated by a mob. On a subsequent motion to set the verdict aside as depriving the appellant of his constitutional rights, it was held that absence at the reception of the verdict had been waived by the failure to take timely advantage of it, and it was again found that the jury had not been influenced by a hostile mob. The United States District Court refused a hearing on the appellant's petition for a writ of *habeas corpus*, setting forth the reception of the verdict in his absence and the same allegations of mob domination which the state court had found untrue. *Held*, that the hearing was properly refused. *Frank v. Mangum*, 35 Sup. Ct. 582.

For a discussion of objections to the reception of evidence raised in the first motion for a new trial, see 27 HARV. L. REV. 762. For a discussion of the issue of this appeal, see NOTES, p. 793.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — DUE PROCESS OF LAW — REQUIRING DELIVERY OF CARS TO CONNECTING CARRIER. — Pursuant to statute, the Michigan Railroad Commission made an order requiring the defendant railroad to deliver its cars to a connecting electric railway for transportation to points of consignment along the line of the latter. The order did not provide for compensation, but in mandamus proceedings the state court held that the defendant would be entitled to compensation under the statute. *Held*, that the regulation is due process of law. *Michigan Central R. Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission*, 236 U. S. 615.

For a discussion of this case, in connection with the question of the constitutionality of orders requiring through carriage, see NOTES, p. 799.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — PERSONAL RIGHTS: CIVIL, POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS — RIGHT TO VOTE AT FEDERAL ELECTIONS. — A federal statute makes it unlawful to "conspire to injure, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise of any right secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States." U. S. COMP. STAT. 1913, § 10183. The defendants were convicted under this statute for having conspired to prevent certain duly qualified electors from voting at an election where members of Congress were chosen. *Held*, that the conviction is proper. *United States v. Aczel*, 219 Fed. 917 (Dist. Ct., Ind.).

The defendants contended that the privilege of voting at such an election was conferred by the state alone, and in no wise by the Constitution or laws of the United States. It is true that the Constitution does not confer immediately upon any one the right to vote. *Minor v. Happersett*, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 162; see *United States v. Cruikshank*, 92 U. S. 542, 556; *United States v. Reese*, 92 U. S. 214, 217. And the only control which the federal government has over purely state elections lies in the enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment. *Luckey v. United States*, 107 Fed. 114. But where federal officers are to be chosen at the election, a different situation arises. The Constitution now provides that members of the House of Representatives and Senators shall be elected by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. Art. I, § 2; Seventeenth Amendment, § 1. The states thus fix the qualifications for their electors, and the United States adopts these qualifications for its own electors. *Ex parte Siebold*, 100 U. S. 371, 388; *Ex parte Yarbrough*, 110 U. S. 651, 663; *Swafford*